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Abstract 
Grain for Green Programs (GGP) in Zhejiang province plays important role in protecting the environment, soil 
erosion prevention, production adjustment, and lifestyles promotion for local farmers. In this paper, the Chun’an 
County of Zhejiang Province was selected for the case study on analyzing the aspects of employment modes such as 
agricultural households, their income sources, and the corresponding industrial restructuring caused by the 
implementation of forestry ecological compensation in Zhejiang province. The corresponding strategies and 
suggestions for improving the mechanism of forestry ecological compensation were proposed. 
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1. Introduction 
Grain fo r Green Program (GGP) is a national pro ject to combat soil erosion and improve ecological 
environment. The implementation of the GGP mainly relies on switching the land use at the location 
where the original steep slopes are not suitable for the development o f crops and bared land by natural 
recovery or artificial reconstruction. The aims of the GGP are restoring forestsˈmaintain ing regional 
ecological security, and providing some major forest products. 
 Although Zhejiang province is not included in the National Project plan, the local government 
attaches great importance to the Grain fo r Green Programs. While the Central Government proposed to 
switch the land use of farmland back into forests, Zhejiang province also implemented provincial Grain 
for Green Program at the sources area of eight river systems. The local government established several 
methods such as employ seedling compensation, tax refund  of special agricultural and forestry products, 
and guarantee of property rights of forest and grassland, which can encourage and protect farmers’ 
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motivation  to change land use from farmland to forests. In other words, forestry ecological compensation 
mechanis m will be useful for those who switched farmland back to forest, which can  significant improve 
the ecological environment.  
The problems in the eco-compensation mechanism of Grain fo r Green Programs and the willingness of 
the farmers to be involved in the pro ject in the Zhejiang province were analyzed to propose strategies and 
recommendations for the implementation of corresponding eco -compensation mechanism such as 
compensation classificat ion, compensation standards, diversified funding sources and compensation 
diversification. 
2. Theories and Practices 
 Eco logical compensation mechanis m has been proved to be an effective solution to ecological 
protection and coordinated socio-economic development. The Grain fo r Green Program has an obviously 
positive externality. The implementation of the project will b ring the involved farmers economic benefits, 
which will improve the ecological environment. 
In 1997, Costa Rica adopted a fo restry ecological compensation plan, which paid for the farmers’ loss 
caused by land version into forest and compensated for the behavior of protecting ecological services 
(Zbinden and Lee, 2005). The U.S. government launched the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in 
1985, which would function as an excellent reference for the implementation of similar programs in the 
design of scope, standards, and duration in other countries.  
In the respect of policy design, McCaskill et al. (2003) studied how to coordinate the relat ionship 
between afforestation and farming, calcu lated the influence of the economic incentives of the forestry and 
agricultural policies on private afforestation inclination by regression analysis. 
In China, many studies evaluated the performance of the p ilot Grain for Green Programs and the 
progress they achieved in the past 10 years. Since 2000, Zhejiang province started to compensate for 
resources usage through establishing a forestry ecological compensation fund to subsidize the10 counties 
(cities, districts) at The Qiantang River headwater region. 
3. Methodologies  
3.1. Background of study area 
Chun'an county is located in western Zhejiang Province, with a total area of 442666 hectare, in which 
forest area is 358466 hectare. Local people cu ltivated in  mountains for gain  grain. There are 3866 hectare 
farmlands with slope above 25 degree, which result in deterioration of the local ecological environment, 
soil erosion, droughts, and floods occur frequently. Thus the GGP plays very important role in the 
sustainable socio-economic development   Chun’an county.  
3.2. Methodologies   
(1) Modeling development 
The forestry ecological compensation in the implementation of Grain fo r Green Programs exerts 
profound influence on the farmers’ industrial structure and revenue structure. We conducted on site 
investigation on the Grain for Green Pro ject at Chun’an county. In order to investigate the effects of 
compensation policy, we used mult ivariate selection discrete model to analyze the influence of 
compensation mechanism on the employment transfer of agricultural households. The selec tion variables 
are the employment modes and revenue structure.  
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Assume there are J choices, the utility function (latent variable) of the jth choice of the ith decision 
maker is: 
ij i j ijn z a H 
                                     (1) 
Where is the ith decision maker’s 1*q characteristic variable,   is q*1 Coefficient vector. If the utility 
of the kth choice is larger than the other, the decision maker would likely select the k choice. Therefore˖ 
' '
( ) ( )ijk ij ik i j i ij ik i j ijv n n z a a zH H J H       
                                      (2) 
Assuming the errors are independentˈsubject to extreme value distributionˈthen get a multinomial 
Logit Model. 
(2) Dependent and independent variables  
Dependent variable (explained variable˅ 
Farm is defined as a set of employment d istribution of agricu ltural household labors (1 = pure farming; 
2 = part-time farming; 3 = non-farming). 
Independent variables (exp lanatory variables) were selected by step wise regression analysis, which 
include:  agricultural income in household revenue˖the ratio of pure agricultural income over total 
revenue of the household˗ 
Parti (dummy variable) is participation of grain  for green programs: 1 = participationˈ 0 = no 
participation˗ 
Hill (dummy variable˅: Whether or not does the region lie in a mountainous area˄1=yesˈ0=no˗ 
Steep (dummy variable) is Steep arable land: 1=noˈ0=yes (for this variable is correlated with another 
variable (parti) , this variable choice inverse assignment)˗ 
Compc (dummy variab le) is Satisfaction about compensation ˄ compcˈ dummy variable˅˖
1=satisfied, 0=unsatisfied˗ 
Educ is Education leve: actual age based on the survey˗ 
The governing equation of this model is˖ 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6i ifarm wage parti hill steep compc educD D D D D D D H       
      (3) 
 3.3 Analysis results 
Table1 discrete choice model results Compensate effects on employment  
Multinomial  logistic    regression LR chi2(14)     = 20.32 
Log likelihood = -121.40548  Pseudo R2       = 0.0772 
farm       Coef.   Std. Err. z P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
1   ˄ plantation  ˅          (base outcome) 
2   ˄ agriculture plus˅ 
age       .0575213      .032751           1.76           0.079      -.0066695          .1217122 
parti    1.043957     .770118             1.36           0.175      -.4654469          2.553362 
educ   -.0578649    .1512422          -0.38           0.702       -.354294           .2385644 
hill    -.3218696      .8267293           -0.39          0.697     -1.94222            1.29849 
steep   -1.018001   .8473405           -1.20          0.230      -2.678757            .6427563 
compc    1.404288   .8204731          1.71           0.087     -.2038094           3.012386 
wage   -.8652679   1.331478         -0.65           0.516       -3.474916           1.74438 
_cons   -2.014684   2.335531          -0.86         0.388      -6.5922               2.562872 
3  ˄non-agriculture˅ 
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age    .0222912   .0215277          1.04        0.300        -.0199024 .0644848 
parti    .7185212   .5449262          1.32        0.187        -.3495145 1.786557 
educ    .0538648   .0982535           0.55          0.584       -.138708 6 .2464382 
hill   -.2039132   .5589068         -0.36          0.715         -1.29935  .891524 
steep   -.7731699   .5468101         -1.41       0.157        -1.844898 .2985582 
compc    1.139382   .5790021        1.97        0.049         .0045588 2.274205 
wage   -2.003932   .8361455         -2.40        0.017         -3.642747 -.3651166 
_cons    .7105931   1.524086         0.47        0.641          -2.27656  3.697746 
4. Discussion on results   
4.1 Participation of grain for green programs 
 Active participation in Grain for Green Programs will promote the employment  transfer of the 
agricultural households and the correspondent industrial transfer, which can  reduce the distinction of 
economic and social conditions between town and country. The results of analysis suggests that the 
agricultural households participated in Grain fo r Green Programs are more likely to transfer to part -time 
farming than to non-farming employment, which coincides with actual situation.  
4.2 The influence of revenue after compensation on employment decision of agri cultural households 
Agricultural revenue has significant influence on employment behavior of the agricultural households 
after transferring cropland to  forests. The agricu ltural household who lost cropland will start non -farming 
activities after been compensated. Agricultural revenue is negatively correlated with non-farming 
activities, which ind icate that rural labor fo rces gradually have been transferred to non -farming industry 
after returning cropland to forests.   
4.3 Influence of labor forces and human capital on employment transfer 
The results show that age has relatively greater impact on employment choices than educational level 
engaged in agriculture and non-agricu ltural occupation. The marginal of age added will reduce the 
occurrence rate of employ ment choices non-agricultural occupation, but insignificant. Because of higher 
opportunity cost, the education years of the rural households in employment has a reverse impact on 
agriculture occupation.  Engaged in non-agricu ltural employment, this impact is positive indicator of high 
level of education, which is helpful to access the city employment market. 
4.4 Influence of zoning of agricultural household on employment  
The results show that farmer’s regional advantages have the significant impact on rural  employment 
shift. Farmers who live in the mountains with disadvantage location may have limitation on employment 
shift, but this trend is not obvious.  
4.5 The influence of land types on farmers’ employment after turning agricultural land into forest  
According to the policy of returning farmlands to forests, only those farmlands with slope above 25 
degree should be transferred back to fo rests. If the slope of transferred land is below 25 degree, the 
household will not get compensation. The influence of such land on employment transfer is limited. The 
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results show that non-sloped farmland is negatively correlated with employment transfer of the 
households. 
4.6 Farmers’ satisfaction with the compensation standards 
Compensation standards of returning farmland to forests should be the sum of opportunity cost plus 
opportunity of the farmland transformation. In  fact, the households are not compensated in this way, 
which leads to higher or lower compensation that affects farmers’ satisfaction with the standards. The 
results show that farmers’ satisfaction with compensation standards has positive influence on agricultural 
households’ employment transfer.  
5. Conclusion and Recommendation 
In term of  empirical analysis, we find that compensation of Grain for Green Program will impulse 
rural employment transfer, optimize rural industry construction and increase farmer’s income as well. It is 
recommended that the follow advises should be taken into account in the GGP. 
(1) Compensation Based on Regional Differentiation 
At present, compensation standard of Grain for Green Program was adopted as national standards in 
Zhejiang Province. The benefits of the uniform standard are transparent, conducive to social supervision, 
easy to operate, and cost efficient, but its shortages are also obvious, such as inadequate or e xcessive 
compensation.  
 (2) Compensation Based on Structure of Tree Species Differentiation  
The final products of ecological forest are ecological benefits. It  is necessary to establish ecological 
compensation mechanism for ecological forest since the ecological fo rest is a typical public goods with 
large external economy. 
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